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**THE CRIMINAL
INVASION PLAN**

THE EDITORS

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1

**THE COMMITMENT
OF THE INTELLECTUAL**

PAUL A. BARAN

The Philadelphia Seven

ALEXANDER L. CROSBY

EDITORS . . . LEO HUBERMAN . . . PAUL M. SWEETZ

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NOTES FROM THE EDITORS

The commitment of the intellectual, says Paul Baran, in his article in this issue, is "to save from extinction the tradition of humanism, reason, and progress that constitutes our most valuable inheritance from the entire history of mankind." We agree. And the time is *now*. Now when the invasion of Cuba, aided and abetted by the United States, is about to begin. Another generation had its Spanish Civil War; this generation has the war against Cuba. It is, in Baran's words, "both a responsibility and a privilege" of the intellectual, *at this moment*, to do all in his power to keep this country from carrying out its insane policy in respect to Cuba. In the *New York Times*, beginning April 7, and every day thereafter until the moment of writing these notes, there was valuable ammunition that can be used in informing your friends and the members of every organization to which you belong of the plot against Cuba. Both the facts of the matter, and the violations of international law and morality are gone into in illuminating detail.

Study the material carefully; read, for example, the account of the innocent-appearing Western Union cable ship, intercepted by a Cuban gunboat—those hotheaded Cubans, the uninformed would say when the story first broke, "there they go off again, half-cocked, interfering with a vessel obviously out on a peaceful mission!" But in the *Times* of Saturday, April 8, the truth is revealed and the picture takes on an entirely different hue:

But experts watching the situation were most interested in an attempted Navy plot at the Cienfuegos and Baracoa Naval Bases last week-end.

(continued on inside back cover)

THE CRIMINAL INVASION PLAN

A criminal invasion of Cuba is in the advanced stage of planning and may already have been launched by the time these lines are in print.

It is a criminal undertaking in the strictest sense of the term. There are neutrality laws on the statute books of this country which forbid military plotting on American soil against other countries; the position of international law with regard to such activities is unambiguous; and the Charter of the Organization of American States could not be more explicit. Article 15 of the Charter states:

No state or group of states has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other state. The foregoing principle prohibits not only armed force but also any other form of interference or attempted threat against the personality of the state or against its political, economic and cultural elements.

Until a few months ago, the American government and press vehemently denied that an invasion plot against Cuba was being hatched in this country, with or without assistance from Washington. When the Cuban authorities last December ordered a general mobilization against the threat of invasion, official and unofficial spokesmen in this country pooh-pooed the whole idea as preposterous. Nobody was threatening Cuba, it was all a fantastic hoax to incite Cubans against the United States, stories of secret training bases in Guatemala were lies, etc.

The press is now singing a different tune. An invasion army of five to six thousand men is indeed in training. The bases are not only in Guatemala but also in Florida and Louisiana. Armament includes naval vessels, landing craft, an air force, and heavy weapons. A shadow government has been formed in Miami and is ready to move to Cuba as soon as a beachhead is established. It will then ask for recognition and aid from the United States

and Latin American countries. Troops are already being concentrated for D-day.

All this information comes not from Cuban propaganda sources but from a series of articles in the *New York Times* by Tad Szulc and others. It is impossible to believe that it would be published without the approval of the American government. Washington has evidently abandoned its former policy of secrecy and now wants the world not only to know what is going on but also that the United States officially approves.

This is a most ominous development. It means that Washington has in effect publicly identified the invasion plan as a United States-backed and United States-based enterprise. The prestige of the American government is thereby directly involved, and any backing out in case an initial invasion attempt should fail now becomes extremely difficult.

Why has Washington seen fit to commit itself in this way and at this time? There are at least five reasons.

(1) All the old hopes that the Cuban revolutionary regime would some day collapse of its own inner weaknesses and contradictions have had to be abandoned. The cutting off of American supplies has caused shortages and difficulties but no breakdowns. Meanwhile, latest reports from Havana indicate that agricultural production continues to expand. Even the Cuban exile groups in this country, who have long specialized in predictions of imminent disaster, have had to admit, according to the *Saturday Evening Post*, that the bureaucracy "at last is beginning to function with some semblance of efficiency." (Harold H. Martin, "Angry Exiles in Florida," *Saturday Evening Post*, April 8, 1961, p. 80.)

(2) The military strength of the Cuban government is rapidly growing. James Reston reports in the *New York Times* of April 5th that "it is widely believed in official quarters that . . . the military balance of power in the Caribbean will be such within six months that only a major invasion of Cuba by Western Hemisphere forces, including the United States, could hope to deal with the military situation." (One might wonder why there is any need to "deal with the military situation," since no one contends that Cuba is or will be capable of invading any other country. But that would show a woeful lack of understanding of

how the famous "inter-American system" works. Under this ingenious arrangement, every country—except the United States of course—must be invadable, in case of need, by its own counter-revolutionaries. The way the system works at its best was admirably illustrated by Guatemala in 1954.) This, taken together with the growing viability of the Cuban economy and governmental system, means that the entire strategy that has so far been developed for overthrowing the Castro regime will very soon be obsolete, and that the counter-revolutionary armies that have been so painstakingly built up will shortly become a mere nuisance and expense to their hosts. It is these facts, we believe, that explain the timing of the latest shift in United States policy.

(3) They also help to explain the character of the shift. The would-be invasion troops certainly know that the odds against their success are rapidly mounting, and their morale and fighting potential must be suffering accordingly. Washington probably calculated that only a dramatic gesture of United States support could keep the invasion force from disintegrating even before the six-month deadline mentioned by Reston.

(4) Support for the Cuban Revolution has been growing by leaps and bounds in Latin America. The new Quadros regime in Brazil has adopted a foreign policy line much more independent of Washington than that of its predecessor; in particular Quadros has gone out of his way to express sympathy and friendship for revolutionary Cuba. A recent senatorial by-election in Argentina resulted in a sweeping victory for a Socialist Party candidate who ran on a pro-Castro platform. And the even more recent general parliamentary elections in Chile signaled a sharp turn to the Left in that country. These are all straws in the wind pointing to the conclusion that public opinion in favor of the Cuban Revolution is a factor which every Latin American country must take into account in formulating its policies. A counter-revolutionary invasion of Cuba would therefore create difficult problems for all of them and quite probably crises for some. Under the circumstances, Washington doubtless felt that it was necessary publicly to identify the United States with the counter-revolution and in this way to make it easier for wavering Latin American governments to support the invasion when it comes.

(5) Finally, no insider in Washington can have any illu-

sions about the possibility of five or six thousand counter-revolutionaries overthrowing the Castro regime, backed as it is by a well-armed popular militia of some 200,000 to 300,000 men and women plus a highly trained army of perhaps another 30,000. The task assigned to the counter-revolutionaries is the more modest one of establishing a beachhead and proclaiming a provisional government on Cuban soil. From that point, the United States would evidently have to take over. And the chances are very good that this would involve this country in a long and costly war such as that in which France has been bogged down in Algeria for nearly seven years. The American people are not psychologically ready for such an ordeal, and one purpose of Washington's latest policy shift is probably to begin to prepare them.

To sum up: The Cuban policy of the Eisenhower administration is on the verge of complete bankruptcy. Within a few months the long-planned preparatory invasion by counter-revolutionary forces based in the United States and Guatemala will be out of the question. Even the problem of maintaining these forces in being is rapidly becoming unmanageable. At the same time, Latin American public opinion is swinging behind the Cuban Revolution, leaving the United States in an increasingly isolated hemispheric position. If these trends should continue, the United States would very soon be faced with the alternative of either accepting the Cuban Revolution as a *fait accompli* or launching a cold-blooded war of aggression and conquest against it. Since neither of these courses is acceptable, the Kennedy administration finds itself in a position in which it must act immediately. The result is the new policy of revealing all the sordid and damaging facts about the invasion plot, and thus openly committing the United States to its success. In this way it is hoped to check the disintegration of the counter-revolutionary forces, rally wavering Latin American governments to the support of United States policy, and prepare the American people for a possibly protracted and costly struggle.

The next step should logically be the actual launching of the invasion. Unless there is some major development in the international sphere it is hard to see how it can be long delayed.

Under these circumstances, the duty of every man and

woman with a spark of human decency becomes clear. The criminal nature and aims of United States policy toward Cuba must be exposed. International public opinion must be roused in support of Cuba's sovereignty and independence. The American ruling class must be taught, as the British and French ruling classes were taught when they committed the Suez aggression, that the world will no longer tolerate the re-imposition of imperialist rule on a small country that has heroically won its independence and resolutely set its feet on the road to a better and happier future.

The Kennedy administration is fully aware of the crucial nature of the impending struggle for international—and especially Latin American—public opinion over Cuba. That is why, at the same time that it shifted its Cuban strategy, it also issued a “white paper” attempting to justify its determination to destroy the Cuban Revolution.

It is hard to imagine a more hypocritical or dishonest document.

Fidel Castro, it seems, has betrayed the Cuban Revolution. Just imagine the United States State Department, supporter of all the rotten Francos and Chiang Kai-sheks of the world, setting itself up as the final judge of revolutions! (Incidentally, if you want to learn how a State Department-conducted revolution looks, turn to page 19 below and read the story of South Korea in the period since the overthrow of Syngman Rhee just a year ago. This article, we think, should be compulsory reading for our Latin American friends.) And how has Fidel “betrayed” his own revolution? Well, back in the days when the whole nation was united in fighting the Batista tyranny, he promised that the democratic liberties of the Constitution of 1940 would be restored and general elections held within a year of the conquest of power. These promises, says the white paper, have not been kept, and that is what it means when it talks about “betraying the revolution.”

What colossal effrontery! The very government that from the outset has fought against the new regime in Cuba, cut off its trade, armed its foes and incited them to sabotage and terror—this very same government now has the nerve to reproach Fidel with breaches of democratic etiquette! Arthur M. Schlesinger,

Jr., a Harvard history professor on leave as a special assistant to President Kennedy, is supposed to have been the chief author of the white paper. We would like to ask the learned professor: Can you point to one genuine revolution anywhere at any time, that has been carried out in an atmosphere of civil peace and tranquility? Do you think Cuba's lovely "democratic" traditions fit it to play the role of the first country in the world to combine revolution and civil liberties? Or is it perhaps that you and the government for which you speak never wanted Cuba to do more than restore the Constitution of 1940, which of course contained no threat whatever to the profits and privileges of United States investors in Cuba? Is it that you would like to see Cuba return to that corrupt game of political parties and "free" elections which formed, as it were, the staging ground from which the murderous Batista was able to organize his bid for power?

On the matter of making and keeping promises, the white paper has much to say about this famous Constitution of 1940 but is strangely silent about another set of promises that Fidel Castro made, not once but thousands of times during his rise to power. He promised a radical land reform, diversification of agricultural production, rapid industrialization, an end to the scourge of unemployment, health services for all the people, and a new and vastly expanded educational system. Are such matters of no interest to you, gentlemen of Washington? Has it escaped you that *these* promises Fidel Castro and his colleagues have been keeping—every one of them and with a literalness that has few parallels in revolutionary history? Or perhaps you *have* noticed it, and perhaps you don't approve? Promises and performances of this kind, one gathers, have no place in what you are pleased to call "the authentic and autonomous revolution of the Americas." This splendid-sounding institution is presumably better exemplified by the plutocratic rule and corruption, the inflation and unemployment, the poverty and disease, which are such prominent features of "democracy" in Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and Venezuela—not to mention the smaller and less richly endowed republics to the south of us.

But what about Communism, we can hear you asking. According to the white paper, Fidel has installed Communists in many important governmental positions, thus establishing what is

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ominously described as a "Communist Bridgehead." What of it, gentlemen? Is that supposed to frighten intelligent adults more than a decade and a half after the victory of the grand alliance of Communists and democrats over Nazism in World War II? Wouldn't it be more sensible to ask what kind of a job the Communists in Cuba are doing? If they are working hard and effectively for the success of the Revolution, shouldn't we congratulate Fidel for having found good helpers? If they are not, well then they, like everyone else, are open to legitimate criticism. Unfortunately you provide us with no evidence on which to base a judgment.

Another charge of the white paper: Fidel has sold his country to the "Sino-Soviet bloc." The proof? Cuba now sells her products to the socialist countries and buys what she needs from them. Where else should she sell and buy? The United States? Ah, but surely you haven't forgotten about the oil companies' refusal to sell to Cuba, about the cancellation of the sugar quota, about the trade embargo? Do you think Cuba *wants* to do so much of her trading with countries half way 'round the world? There's an easy way to find out: restore the sugar quota and allow America's manufacturers to sell freely to Cuba again. You would be surprised to see how quickly the Communist "monopoly" of Cuban trade would dissolve—to the hearty plaudits of the wicked Communists themselves.

One final charge the white paper makes—the most serious of all, it would seem from the grave terms in which it is couched. Cuba is threatening the "inter-American system." To this, we fear, the Cubans have no answer. It is plainly true. They are guilty. For the enlightenment of the uninitiated, however, we should add what most Latin Americans already know from long and bitter experience, that the "inter-American system" is merely a fancy euphemism for Yankee imperialism. The more it is threatened and the sooner it is liquidated, the better for all of us—Latin Americans and North Americans alike.

(April 10, 1961)

THE COMMITMENT OF THE INTELLECTUAL

BY PAUL A. BARAN

What is an intellectual? The most obvious answer would seem to be: a person working with his intellect, relying for his livelihood (or if he need not worry about such things, for the gratification of his interests) on his brain rather than on his brawn. Yet simple and straightforward as it is, this definition would be generally considered to be quite inadequate. Fitting everyone who is not engaged in physical labor, it clearly does not gibe with the common understanding of the term "intellectual." Indeed, the emergence of expressions such as "long-haired professor" and "egghead" suggests that somewhere in the public consciousness there exists a different notion encompassing a certain category of people who constitute a narrower stratum than those "working with their brains."

This is not merely a terminological quibble. The existence of these two different concepts rather reflects an actual social condition, the understanding of which can take us a long way towards a better appreciation of the place and the function of the intellectual in society. For the first definition, broad as it is, applies accurately to a large group of people forming an important part of society: individuals working with their minds rather than with their muscles, living off their wits rather than off their hands. Let us call these people *intellect workers*. They are businessmen and physicians, corporate executives and purveyors of "culture," stockbrokers and university professors. There is nothing invidious in this aggregation, no more than there is in the notion "all Americans," or "all people who smoke a pipe." The steady proliferation of that group of intellect workers represents one of the most spectacular results of historical development thus far. It reflects a crucially important aspect of

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the social division of labor, beginning with the early crystallization of a professional clergy and reaching its acme under advanced capitalism—the separation of mental from manual activity, of white collar from blue collar.

Both the causes and the consequences of this separation are complex and all-pervasive. Rendered possible by, and contributing mightily to, the continual expansion of productivity, this separation has become at the same time one of the principal facets of the progressive disintegration of the individual, of what Marx referred to as the "alienation of man from himself." This alienation expresses itself not only in the crippling and distorting effect of this separation on the harmonious development and growth of the individual—an effect which is not mitigated but underscored by the intellect workers' getting some "exercise" and by the manual workers' occasional partaking of "culture"—but also in the radical polarization of society into two exclusive and all but unrelating camps. This polarization, cutting across the antagonism between social *classes*, generates a thick ideological fog obscuring the genuine challenges confronting society, and creates issues as false and schisms as destructive as those resulting from racial prejudice or religious superstition. For all intellect workers have one obvious interest in common: not to be reduced to the more onerous, less remunerative, and—since they are the ones who set the norms of respectability—less respected manual labor. Driven by this interest, they tend to hypostatize their own position, to exaggerate the difficulty of their work and the complexity of the skills required for it, to inflate the importance of formal education, of academic degrees, etc. And in seeking to protect their position, they pitch themselves against manual labor, identify themselves with the intellect workers who comprise the ruling class, and side with the social order which has given rise to their status and which has created and protected their privileges.

Thus under capitalism the intellect worker is typically the faithful servant, the agent, the functionary, and the spokesman of the capitalist system. Typically, he takes the existing order of things for granted and questions the prevailing state of affairs solely within the limited area of his immediate preoccupation. This preoccupation is with the job in hand. He may not be

satisfied with the level of costs in the factory which he owns, manages, or in which he is employed, and may seek to lower them. He may be given the task of "selling" public opinion on a new soap or a new political candidate, and he will carefully, scientifically attend to his assignment. He may not be content with the current knowledge of the structure of the atom, and hence will devote prodigious energies and talent to finding ways and means of expanding it. One might be tempted to call him a *technician*, but this could easily be misunderstood. As a president of a corporation, he may make weighty decisions affecting the national economy as well as the jobs and lives of thousands of people. As an important government official, he may greatly influence the course of world affairs. And as a head of a large foundation or scientific organization, he may determine the direction and the methods of research of a large number of scientists over a long period of time. All this is clearly not what is meant by the term "technician," which usually denotes individuals whose task it is not to formulate policies but to carry them out, not to set goals but to work out the means of their realization, not to provide the great designs but to look after the small details. And yet the designation "technician" comes closer to encompassing the nature of what I mean by "intellect worker" than the customary use of the word would suggest.

For, to repeat, the purpose of the intellect worker's work and thought is the particular job in hand. It is the rationalization, mastery, and manipulation of whatever branch of reality he is immediately concerned with. In this regard he differs little, if at all, from the manual worker who molds metal sheets, assembles parts of an engine, or lays bricks in constructing a wall. Putting it in negative terms, the intellect worker *as such* is not addressing himself to the meaning of his work, its significance, its place within the entire framework of social activity. In still other words, he is not concerned with the relation of the segment of human endeavor within which he happens to operate to other segments and to the totality of the historical process. His "natural" motto is to mind his own business, and, if he is conscientious and ambitious, to be as efficient and as successful at it as possible. For the rest, let others, too, attend to their business, whatever it may be. Accustomed to think in terms of training,

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experience, and competence, the intellect worker regards dealing with problems of that totality as one specialty among many. This is to him the "field" of philosophers, religious functionaries, or politicians, even as "culture" or "values" are the business of poets, artists, and sages.

Not that every intellect worker explicitly formulates and consciously holds this view. Yet he has, one might almost say, an instinctive affinity to theories incorporating and rationalizing it. One of them is Adam Smith's time-honored and well known concept of the world in which everyone by cultivating his own garden contributes most to the flourishing of the gardens of all. In the light of this philosophy, the concern with the whole moves out of the center of the individual's preoccupation, and affects him, if at all, merely marginally, that is to say in his capacity as a citizen. And the strength and influence of this philosophy derive from the very important truth that it conveys: that under capitalism the whole confronts the individual as an overpowering objectified process irrationally propelled by obscure forces which he is incapable of comprehending, let alone of influencing.

The other theory which reflects the condition and satisfies the requirements of the intellect worker is the notion of the separation of means from ends, of the divorce between science and technology on the one side and the formulation of goals and values on the other. This position, the ancestry of which is at least as distinguished as that of Adam Smith, has been aptly referred to by C. P. Snow as a "way to contract out." In Snow's words, those "who want to contract out say *we* produce the tools. *We* stop there. It is for *you*, the rest of the world, the politicians, to say how the tools are used. The tools may be used for purposes which most of us would regard as bad. If so, we are sorry. But as scientists, this is no concern of ours." And what applies to scientists applies with equal force to all other intellect workers.

Needless to say, "contracting out" leads in practice to the same attitude as the Smithian "minding one's own business"; it is indeed nothing but another name for it. And this attitude re-

* Address delivered to the American Association for the Advancement of Science in New York on December 27, 1960, as published in *MONTHLY REVIEW*, February, 1961, p. 507. Italics in the original.

mains essentially unaffected by the now generally felt disposition to put one's faith in the government rather than in the principles of *laissez faire*, to substitute for God's invisible hand the more obvious if by no means necessarily more beneficent hand of the capitalist state. The result is the same: the concern with the whole becomes irrelevant to the individual, and by leaving this concern to others he *eo ipso* accepts the existing structure of the whole as a datum and subscribes to the prevailing criteria of rationality, to the dominant values, and to the socially enforced yardsticks of efficiency, achievement, and success.

Now I submit that it is in the relation to the issues presented by the *entire* historical process that we must seek the decisive watershed separating intellect workers from intellectuals.* For what marks the intellectual and distinguishes him from the intellect workers and indeed from all others is that his concern with the entire historical process is not a tangential interest but permeates his thought and significantly affects his work. To be sure, this does not imply that the intellectual in his daily activity is engaged in the study of all of historical development. This would be a manifest impossibility. But what it does mean is that the intellectual is systematically seeking to relate whatever specific area he may be working in to other aspects of human existence. Indeed, it is precisely this effort to *interconnect* things which, to intellect workers, operating within the framework of capitalist institutions and steeped in bourgeois ideology and culture, necessarily appear to lie in strictly separate compartments of society's knowledge and society's labor—it is this effort to interconnect which constitutes one of the intellectual's outstanding characteristics. And it is likewise this effort which identifies one of the intellectual's principal functions in society: to serve as a symbol and as a reminder of the fundamental fact that the seemingly autonomous, disparate, and disjointed morsels of social existence under capitalism—literature, art, politics, the economic order, science, the cultural and psychic condition of

* To avoid a possible misunderstanding: intellect workers can be (and sometimes are) intellectuals, and intellectuals are frequently intellect workers. I say frequently, because many an industrial worker, artisan, or farmer can be (and in some historical situations often has been) an intellectual without being an intellect worker.

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people—can all be understood (and influenced) only if they are clearly visualized as parts of the comprehensive totality of the historical process.

This principle "the truth is the whole"—to use an expression of Hegel—carries with it, in turn, the inescapable necessity of refusing to accept as a datum or to treat as immune from analysis, any single part of the whole. Whether the investigation relates to unemployment in one country, to backwardness and squalor in another, to the state of education now, or to the development of science at some other time, no set of conditions prevailing in society can be taken for granted, none can be considered to be "extraterritorial." And it is wholly inadmissible to refrain from laying bare the complex relations between whatever phenomenon happens to be at issue and what is unquestionably the central core of the historical process: the dynamics and evolution of the social order itself.

Even more important is to realize the implications of the practice, studiously cultivated by bourgeois ideologists, of regarding the so-called "values" held by people as lying outside the purview of scientific scrutiny. For these "values" and "ethical judgments" which to the intellect workers are untouchable data, do not drop from heaven. They themselves constitute important aspects and results of the historical process and need not merely be taken cognizance of but must be examined with regard to their origin and to the part which they play in historical development. In fact, the de-fetishization of "values," "ethical judgments," and the like, the identification of the social, economic, psychic causes of their emergence, change, and disappearance, as well as the uncovering of the specific interests which they serve at any particular time, represent the greatest single contribution that an intellectual can make to the cause of human advancement.

And this raises a further issue. Interpreting their function as the application of the most efficient means to the attainment of some stipulated ends, the intellect workers take an agnostic view of the ends themselves. In their capacities as specialists, managers, and technicians, they believe they have nothing to do with the formulation of goals; nor do they feel qualified to express a preference for one goal over another. As mentioned

above, they admit that they may have some predilections as citizens, with their predilections counting for no more and no less than those of other citizens. But as scientists, experts, scholars, they wish to refrain from endorsing one or another of these "value judgments." It should be perfectly clear that such abdication amounts in practice to the endorsement of the *status quo*, to lending a helping hand to those who are seeking to obstruct any change of the existing order of things in favor of a better one. It is this "ethical neutrality" which has led many an economist, sociologist, and anthropologist to declare that *qua* scientist he cannot express any opinion on whether it would be better or worse for the people of underdeveloped countries to enter the road to economic growth; and it is in the name of the same "ethical neutrality" that eminent scientists have been devoting their energies and talents to the invention and perfection of means of bacteriological warfare.

But it could be objected at this point that I am begging the question, that the issue arises precisely because of the impossibility of deducing by means of evidence and logic alone any statements concerning what is good or what is bad or what contributes to, rather than militates against, human welfare. Whatever force there may be in this argument, it is actually beside the point. It can be readily granted that there is no possibility of arriving at a judgment on what is good or bad for human advancement which would be *absolutely* valid regardless of time and space. But such an *absolute*, universally applicable judgment is what might be called a false target, and the insistence on its indispensability is an aspect of a reactionary ideology. The truth is that what constitutes an opportunity for human progress, for improvement in the lot of men and also what is conducive or inimical to its realization, differs in the course of history from one period to the next, and from one part of the world to another. The questions with regard to which judgments are required have never been *abstract*, speculative questions concerning "good" or "bad" in general; they have always been *concrete* problems placed on the agenda of society by the tensions, contradictions, and changing constellations of the historical process. And at no time has there been a possibility or, for that matter, a necessity to arrive at *absolutely* valid solutions; at all

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times there is a challenge to use mankind's accumulated wisdom, knowledge, and experience to attain as close as possible an *approximation* to what constitutes the best solution under the prevailing conditions.

But if we are to follow the "contractors out," the "ethically neutral" minders of their own business, then we would bar precisely that stratum in society which has (or ought to have) the largest knowledge, the most comprehensive education, and the greatest possibility for exploring and assimilating historical experience, from providing society with such humane orientation and such intelligent guidance as may be obtainable at every concrete junction on its historical journey. If, as an eminent economist recently remarked, "all possible opinions count, no more and no less than my own," then what is, indeed, the contribution which scientists and intellect workers of all kinds are willing and able to make to society's welfare? The answer, that it is the "know-how" for the realization of whatever objectives society may elect, is completely unsatisfactory. For it should be obvious that society's "elections" do not come about by miracles, that society is guided into some "elections" by the ideology generated by the social order existing at any given time, and is cajoled, frightened, and forced into other "elections" by the interests which are in a position to do the cajoling, the frightening, and the forcing. The intellect worker's withdrawal from seeking to influence the outcome of those "elections" is far from leaving a vacuum in the area of "value" formation. It merely abandons this vital field to charlatans, crooks, and others whose intentions and designs are everything but humanitarian.

It may be well to mention one further argument which is advanced by some of the most consistent "ethical neutralists." They observe, sometimes haltingly and blushing, that after all it is by no means establishable on grounds of evidence and logic that there is any virtue in being humanitarian. Why shouldn't some people starve if their suffering enables others to enjoy affluence, freedom, and happiness? Why should one seek a better life for the masses instead of taking good care of one's own interests? Why should one worry about the proverbial "milk for the Hottentots," if such worry causes discomfort or inconvenience to oneself? Isn't the humanitarian position in itself a "value

judgment" for which there is no logical base? Some thirty years ago I was asked these questions in a public meeting by a Nazi student leader (who eventually became a prominent SS man and functionary of the Gestapo), and the best answer that I could think of then is still the best answer I can think of now: a meaningful discussion of human affairs can only be conducted with humans; one wastes one's time talking to beasts about matters related to people.

This is the issue on which the intellectual cannot compromise. Disagreements, arguments, and bitter struggles are unavoidable and, indeed, indispensable to ascertain the nature, and the means to the realization, of conditions necessary for the health, development, and happiness of men. But the adherence to humanism, the insistence on the principle that the quest for human advancement requires no scientific or logical justification, constitutes what might be called the axiomatic foundation of all meaningful intellectual effort, an axiomatic foundation without the acceptance of which an individual can neither consider himself nor be thought of as an intellectual.

Although the writings of C. P. Snow leave no doubt that he would unreservedly accept this point of departure, it would seem that he believes the commitment of the intellectual to be essentially reducible to the obligation to speak the truth. (It is worth noting here that there is also no basis in evidence or logic for the proposition that truth should be preferred to lies!). In fact, the principal reason for his admiration for scientists is their devotion to truth. Scientists—he says in the previously referred to address—"want to find what is *there*. Without that desire, there is no science. It is the driving force of the whole activity. It compels the scientist to have an overriding respect for truth, every stretch of the way. That is, if you're going to find what is *there*, you mustn't deceive yourself or anyone else. You mustn't lie to yourself. At the crudest level, you mustn't fake your experiments." (Italics in the original.) And yet, while this injunction goes a long way towards formulating the basic commitment of the intellectual, it falls short of taking care of the entire problem. For the problem is not merely whether truth is being told but also what *constitutes* truth in any given case as well as *about what* it is being told and *about what* it is being


withheld. Even in the area of the natural sciences these are important issues, and there are powerful forces at work shunting the energies and abilities of scientists in certain directions and impeding or sterilizing the results of their work in others. When it comes to matters related to the structure and dynamics of society, the problem assumes central significance. For a true statement about a social fact can (and most likely will) turn into a lie if the fact referred to is torn out of the social whole of which it forms an integral part, if the fact is isolated from the historical process in which it is imbedded. Thus in this domain what constitutes truth is frequently (and can be safely) sought and said about things that do not matter, with the insistence on the pursuit and pronouncement of that kind of truth becoming a powerful ideological weapon of the defenders of the *status quo*. On the other hand, telling the truth about what *does* matter, seeking the truth about the whole, and uncovering the social and historical causes and interconnections of the different parts of the whole is decried as unscientific and speculative and is punished by professional discrimination, social ostracism, and outright intimidation.

The desire to tell the truth is therefore only *one* condition for being an intellectual. The other is courage, readiness to carry on rational inquiry to wherever it may lead, to undertake "ruthless criticism of everything that exists, ruthless in the sense that the criticism will not shrink either from its own conclusions or from conflict with the powers that be" (Marx). An intellectual is thus in essence a *social critic*, a person whose concern is to identify, to analyze, and in this way to help overcome the obstacles barring the way to the attainment of a better, more humane, and more rational social order. As such he becomes the conscience of society and the spokesman of such progressive forces as it contains in any given period of history. And as such he is inevitably considered a "troublemaker" and a "nuisance" by the ruling class seeking to preserve the *status quo*, as well as by the intellect workers in its service who accuse the intellectual of being utopian or metaphysical at best, subversive or seditious at worst.

The more reactionary a ruling class, the more obvious it becomes that the social order over which it presides has turned

into an impediment to human liberation, the more is its ideology taken over by anti-intellectualism, irrationalism, and superstition. And by the same token, the more difficult it becomes for the intellectual to withstand the social pressures brought upon him, to avoid surrendering to the ruling ideology and succumbing to the intellect workers' comfortable and lucrative conformity. Under such conditions it becomes a matter of supreme importance and urgency to insist on the function and to stress the commitment of the intellectual. For it is under such conditions that it falls to his lot, both as a responsibility and as a privilege, to save from extinction the tradition of humanism, reason, and progress that constitutes our most valuable inheritance from the entire history of mankind.

It may be said that I am identifying being an intellectual with being a hero, that it is unreasonable to demand from people that they should withstand all the pressures of vested interests and brave all the dangers to their individual well-being for the sake of human advancement. I agree that it would be unreasonable to *demand* it. Nor do I. From history we know of many individuals who have been able even in its darkest ages and under the most trying conditions to transcend their private, selfish interests and to subordinate them to the interests of society as a whole. It always took much courage, much integrity, and much ability. All that can be hoped for now is that our country too will produce its "quota" of men and women who will defend the honor of the *intellectual* against all the fury of dominant interests and against all the assaults of agnosticism, obscurantism, and inhumanity.

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KOREA AND U.S. POLICY IN ASIA

BY F. V. MOMENT

Traveling between Inchon and Seoul, you see three faces of present day South Korea—the village, the town, and the city. Most representative are the farming villages, many without electricity, around which small rice paddies pattern the clayish earth. The lively movement of children, naked or ragged as they play in the season's dust, mud, or snow, counterpoints the slow rhythm of women washing laundry across bare rocks or working the fields with their men. The houses are baked red mud thatched with straw, and the more prosperous may have an outhouse in the courtyard. In the summers, the air is heavy with the stench of nightsoil, and there are few trees to break the biting Siberian wind in winter.

You cannot know, just passing through such villages, that almost all their inhabitants are heavily in debt to village usurers for their land; the United States military government's post-World War II "land reform" program saddled Korean peasants with long-term debts so as not to pinch the landowners' fortunes too severely. With no cash to pay the installments, the peasant must go deeper into debt each year. You cannot know that during the winter months a majority of Korea's peasants and their families literally starve, are forced to dig for roots, tear the bark off shrubs, and scavenge the bare mountains for scarce firewood. You cannot know that their life expectancy has actually declined since the Japanese occupation, and now stands at 33 years. Annual income rarely exceeds \$100, and few peasants have ever held more than 10,000 *hwan* (\$9) in their hands. Most Koreans know the 24-letter *Hangul* alphabet, but since books and newspapers are printed in Chinese characters (abolished in North Korea) they are, in effect, illiterate. The peasant village is the most typical face of South Korea today, for 14 million people, three-quarters of the population, live this way.

F. V. Moment is the pseudonym of an American who recently returned from a one-year stay in Korea where he taught political science.

Approaching Seoul, you pass through the industrial suburb of Yong Dong Po on the Southern bank of the Han river. A hundred factory chimneys rise to the sky, and a huge new white building stands at the entrance to the town. But there is no smoke from these Japanese-built factories, many of which still lie in their wartime ruins; and the new building—constructed with American aid—is not a manufacturing plant but a bakery, designed to convert surplus American wheat to bread for the Republic of Korea (ROK) Army. And it too is idle, in fact it never began operation, for the Korean capitalist who bribed Syngman Rhee's government for the contract ran out of capital.

Much of Korea's industry, built during the Japanese occupation as an integral part of the "Greater Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere," depended on raw material from North Korea or Manchuria and now stands as a silent sacrifice to a divided country. Those light industries able to operate are typical early capitalist—textile mills where thousands of teen-age girls earn \$10 a month, a brewery, and a few chemical and pharmaceutical plants. These often shut down due to a lack of demand and inability to compete with smuggled Japanese products. Electric power, which formerly came from the abundant hydro-electric resources of the Yalu river, is available for only a few hours a day.

The human sacrifices to a divided Korea stand in long rows along the dirty streets, fill the cheap *yakju* shops, or in starving desperation turn into hold-up men and pickpockets or try to steal from United States Army compounds that stand behind barbed wire like alien growths. One recalls prints of early 19th-century English industrial towns—grey, hard, and corrupt.

Crossing the Han to Seoul, many East Asia hands are reminded of occupied Japan in the years immediately after the war. Every third male wears a military uniform, for Korea has the world's fourth largest army (600,000 men) in which full generals are paid less than an American private (\$76). The privates get 76c a month. Jeeps and military trucks dominate traffic, while the American compounds flaunt a bright cleanliness against the electricity-starved darkness of the surrounding squalor.

While most of the war damage has been repaired—one of

the few material results of American aid that goes to the extent of 68 percent for consumer goods—the new construction has been primarily of commercial and business property, while hundreds of thousands of Seoul's two million citizens live in canvas or packingboard "cities," rotting shacks, or caves dug into the many small hills of the city. Manufacturing employment, under feudal labor relations, brings about \$25 a month, while white-collar workers can earn about \$40—little more than half of what is necessary to support a family of four. Since unemployment is chronic and heavy, Seoul is a city of innumerable tea rooms, billiard parlors, *Go* rooms and other small refuges where the jobless can spend their days meeting friends whom they cannot bring to homes which often don't exist.

After a hard day, wealthy citizens can relax in the Myong Dong entertainment district, clustered around the United States Embassy, the United States Information Service, and the Bando and Chosun hotels. (The Bando is one of the first buildings rebuilt by the ROK army after the war, because it caters to foreigners; the Chosun houses the American officers' club.) Grown rich from graft in American aid dollars, these Korean gentlemen, many of them "refugees" from the North, meet to rub shoulders with their benefactors, drink good whiskey in the Bando's Sky Room, and enjoy their (relatively) high-priced "UN princesses." In a country where hundreds of thousands of orphans and by official count 300,000 girls walk the streets, it is no surprise that the area is alive with prostitutes and beggars, young and old, waiting for the trickle-down theory of American aid to work for them.

In contrast to Japan's rebuilt and modern cities, Seoul leaves the impression of a huge slum, checkered with irrational islands of corrupted wealth. As a leading Seoul daily, *Hankuk Ilbo* (Korean Daily News), puts it:

Perhaps this is inevitable under a capitalist economy that produces a leisure class. They waste time and money lavishly. The existence of such a class is understandable considering the power of dollars in a country as poor as Korea. . . . Some quarters merely sigh in disgust, pointing out a helpless situation which leaves a country without skill, money, and materials with which to build industry. A backward country should concern itself with useful construction.

We must find a way to exchange the unemployed's pool cues for pickaxes.

An angry disillusionment is the prevailing mood in Seoul less than a year after brave April. At no time since the war have the economic facts of over 30 percent unemployment (three out of ten million) and industry in perpetual stagnation been so widely and seriously discussed. Talk of peasant starvation, Japan, and neutralism fill the four-page newspapers. But until most recently there had been no *public* discussion of the crucial factor in the present situation: the domination of the nation by America.

In February, the signing of the new United States-South Korean economic treaty touched off the bitterest anti-Americanism yet seen there. Because of new provisions that Koreans interpret as undisguised economic and political intervention by Washington, Ambassador McConaughy was denounced as the "Governor General" of Korea and for the first time the term "American imperialism" appeared in print. Students led two "Yankee, Go Home!" demonstrations against the American Embassy, and had to be beaten off by armed (for the first time since April) National Police. Chang Myun's National Assembly ratified the treaty in an atmosphere reminiscent of the Rhee days: thousands of police surrounding the Assembly Building on the pretext of "riot drills." Seemingly intent on cutting their own throats, the United States State Department followed the economic treaty with the third forced devaluation of the *Hwan* within a year, pushing the exchange rate to H1300:\$1 (from 500:1 last January). Commodity prices immediately jumped 20 percent, and 5,000 employees of the American Army—who are forbidden to strike—staged a mass demonstration at the United States Embassy. Even the *New York Times* has been forced to note that Koreans seem "ungrateful" for American help. "Korea is in a time of trouble and want, and no one can see its end," says a recent dispatch from Seoul, that later admits: "Reunification with the richer and manpower hungry Communist state to the north could theoretically solve many problems." It could indeed.

Alarmed by the rapid growth of anti-American sentiment, Chang's government is attempting to ram new "national secur-

ity" bills through the Assembly. Under the pretext of controlling "Communist"—i.e. anti-American and anti-Chang—agitators, the bills are nearly identical with the laws Rhee used as his legal excuse for a police state. Students and workers responded immediately, and as this is written, demonstrations by 30,000 citizens, many led by socialists, are continuing for the fourth straight day in Seoul, "red" Taegu (known as the most revolutionary city in South Korea since its United States-suppressed uprising in 1947), and Pusan.

I am certain that, given a choice, the United States would not have selected Korea to be the "symbol of determination to halt the spread of Communism." The meager natural resources of the country, limited to a little tungsten, coal, and gold, could hardly justify the most unpopular war in American history—"the wrong war, in the wrong place, at the wrong time, with the wrong enemy," General Bradley called it. As a strategic military base, its value is small. As a "showplace of democracy" it has been exposed as a poor joke. But without a doubt, the American presence is necessary to prevent Korea from "going Communist." The real question becomes: at the cost of millions of wasted and miserable lives, is it worth it? More and more Koreans are becoming convinced that it is not.

Westerners, representing the entire political spectrum, expressed surprise and admiration for the "April heroes" who overthrew Syngman Rhee in the face of his American bullets and bayonets. Many were also surprised that the United States supported the students' demands and thereby admitted *de facto* that its sponsorship of Rhee had been a bad mistake. But in Washington's support of the revolt lies the key to American policy in the Far East, and one of the keys to an understanding of Korea's future.

Basically, United States foreign policy in Asia centers around Japan as the bulwark and workshop of capitalism for the continent. The only non-Western and non-Socialist country to complete its industrial revolution, Japan alone has the capital, labor force, and technology to serve as the middleman for the most powerful capitalist nation on earth. Some \$2 billion in aid, the Korean War (during which United States defense contracts finally pushed Japanese employment and production figures over

prewar levels), and an estimated \$1 billion in American private investment were required to reconstruct Japanese capitalism and prepare it for its present role. Washington's current efforts to force Japan to pay back some of the aid debt, the reduction in off-shore procurement funds, and pressure to allow a higher rate of dollar remittances are all signs that the United States regards Japan, with dollar reserves now totaling \$1.5 billion, as fully able to shoulder its "responsibilities" and to take its ordained place in America's Asian policy.

These responsibilities are to substitute Japanese investment, trade, and technical assistance for the direct dollar aid that the United States is now lavishing on such wards as South Vietnam, Formosa, the Philippines, and South Korea. Japanese corporations, with proximity, experience, and lower labor costs, are able to make profitable investments where American capitalists find neither the political nor the financial climate attractive. War reparations, as in the recent case of South Vietnam, have almost completely returned to Japan in exchange for the products of Japanese industries.

Washington's new policy toward Japan and the Asian satellites does not stem from a mere desire to "save the dollar" by cutting government expenditures abroad. The \$1 billion that American capitalists have already invested—an amount that is increasing rapidly—has been almost exclusively in the export-oriented *Zaibatsu* (monopoly) sector. The oil industry, for example, is under the majority stock control of the American oil giants, while licensing agreements with both light and heavy manufacturers insure that American capitalists take a profitable cut from many Japanese exports. The crux of the matter is that Washington has a large and direct interest in sponsoring Japan's new "Greater Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere." It hopes that by turning over its Asian satellites to Japan for exploitation, private American investment in Japanese industry can be increased and made more profitable. The major obstacle to the carrying out of this policy in Korea was Syngman Rhee.

Anti-Japanese sentiment in Korea was naturally strong after liberation from 40 years of Japanese rule. Rhee exploited it from his rise to power in 1945-1948 until his overthrow in April, 1960. His policy of complete isolation from Japan banned not only all

Japanese books, films, travel, mail, and language, but also any economic penetration—except trade essential to Korea. He gave one excuse after another to the State Department for breaking off “normalization” talks with Japan, which the United States sponsored. The last break was caused by the repatriation agreement of 1959 under which at least 100,000 of the 500,000 Koreans living in Japan are going to North Korea.

Until Dulles's death, the United States was content to support Rhee as a reliable, if sometimes embarrassing, anti-Communist agent. But, more recently, his calls to “march North” to unify Korea under his dictatorship, his advocacy in Washington of an immediate nuclear attack upon the USSR and China, and above all his continued obstruction of long-range American policy in Asia caused the United States to cast about for a more pliable South Korean tool. After all, the \$3 billion spent on Korea since 1945 should buy something better than a senile dictator more anti-Japanese than anti-Communist.

The rigged elections of March 15, 1960, demonstrated to the world—if it still needed convincing—that Rhee maintained himself in power by force of arms and corruption. They provided the ideal situation in which finally to dump the Old Man. The unanimous and spontaneous student uprising came as a godsend to Ambassador McConaughy (General Magruder, the other ruler of Korea, was, by personal inclination, more sympathetic to Rhee) and enabled him to appear before the world as a defender of democracy and, though belatedly, a foe of dictatorship. Members of the United States Embassy wept and offered their resignations as they watched police fire into the ranks of teen-age students—as if this were the first time under Rhee's rule that such atrocities had been committed! Herter's statement of April 22 that “Rhee had employed means unsuited to a free democracy” gave the students the necessary encouragement to enable them to increase their demands, originally calling for Vice-President Lee Ki Poong's resignation and new elections, to include the dictator's own resignation. McConaughy's *aide memoire* of April 21, 1960, included a list of actions “the government of Korea might well consider taking” with a view to breaking down Rhee's system of political control. The United States was intervening in this fashion, the note said, “as the principal

sponsor of the Republic of Korea," because it was concerned that "the present situation, if not corrected, could easily provide fertile ground for Communist manipulation." It was such public pressure, together with personal urgings by McConaughy, that persuaded the panicky old man that his sponsors had withdrawn their support.

It is not to detract from the heroism and sacrifice of the Korean students to say that without the intervention of the United States they would have paid a much higher price than 188 lives for their success. In Korea, a puppetmaster has always pulled the strings, and now he took his puppet off the stage.

The reversal of Rhee's Japanese policy was the first, and today is still the only, real change in Korean official theory and practice. Immediately after the revolt, in the heady days of April and May, Japanese magazines and books came from hiding to be sold openly in the streets and shops, while fantasies lauding Rhee, written by academic hacks, were hawked as toilet paper. Japanese records began to be heard in tea rooms. The interim government of Huh Chung lost no time in inviting a corps of Japanese newsmen to Seoul, for the first time since liberation. Trade and cultural delegations began to go back and forth, and Korean ex-collaborators were received back into a society emerging from a long winter of isolation. The great obstacle to Japanese penetration had been removed, and the way to implementation of United States policy was opened.

The Democratic Party, the nominal opposition to Rhee's Liberal Party, is distinguished primarily by its leaders' former associations with the Japanese. They did not differ from Rhee politically, but simply had the misfortune to have remained in Korea while Rhee and his cohorts lived at ease in American exile. Their leader, former Vice-President Chang Myun, was himself an education official under the Japanese, and most members of his cabinet were Japanese educated. Aid dollars and fat International Cooperation Administration contracts (rarely, if ever, carried out) were distributed to "in" businessmen by Rhee's lieutenant Lee Ki Poong, the April suicide, while the "outs" formed the Democratic Party, did their best to avoid being outlawed, and waited for the day when they could cut their share of the pie. The Liberals owe their existence to the United States

Military Government, which sold all Japanese property after the liberation, in effect putting the country up for grabs. Since collaborators were barred from bidding, Rhee's group of *nouveaux riches*, government bureaucrats, and many refugees from the North eager for their bit (Japanese property as well as large landholdings were nationalized or distributed free there), took over the material wealth of Korea and thereafter constituted the backing of the Liberal Party.

There are, of course, not enough members of a native Korean capitalist or middle class to support either nominally "capitalist" party. Korea is an essentially feudal country with the exchange system of capitalism operating only in the cities. When an economic and social system does not historically correspond to its political system, elections are largely meaningless even when the vote is honest. In Korea, the forms of Western capitalist democracy are imposed on a wholly inadequate framework, and it is not surprising that peasants and even whole villages simply vote "for the government" through ignorance of alternatives or in exchange for wine. The society has not yet reached the point when, mistakenly or not, the people see any relationship between their votes and their lives. In such an atmosphere, the Democrats won the July, 1960, elections for the new parliamentary government. The "outs" became the "ins."

Any South Korean government is most accurately described as a committee for distribution of American aid, and a change involves new operators. One Park Heung-Shik, who formerly owned a chain of department stores in Japan and today sells smuggled Japanese consumer goods in his Korean stores, is being groomed for Lee Ki Poong's position. He was the only non-official person invited to the reception when Japanese Foreign Minister Kosaka visited Seoul in September.

The success of the American program to include South Korea in Japan's economic sphere can be seen in several major steps taken last fall. The Japan-South Korea Economic Association, which includes on the Japanese side the highest executives of the *Zaibatsu*, together with representatives of cement, fertilizer, and consumer goods manufacturers—the commodities for which Korea is most eager—was established in December. The "normalization" talks resumed in Tokyo in November, with in-

dications that diplomatic relations will be established before detailed agreement is reached on the outstanding issues: the status of Korean residents in Japan, reparations, return of art objects, and fishing rights. Meanwhile, only one Japanese boat has been seized by the new government for straying within the "Rhee Line"—which extends far outside Korean territorial waters—and all Japanese fishermen imprisoned by Rhee have been released. The government announced in January that it intends to amend the Rhee law preventing Japanese investment, which limited all foreign investment to the one country with which South Korea had a mutual defense treaty—the United States. Japanese trade delegations have increased in size and importance since last summer.

An American economic advisory group, headed by Dr. Marshall Wattles of the University of Oregon, recently urged that Japan be encouraged to establish branch manufacturing plants in Korea "to help solve Korea's trade deficit and unemployment problems." Chang Myun has even spoken of long-term loans, public and private, from Japan. Korea, he said, is prepared to buy \$100 million of goods if such loans could be negotiated.

But the hand of the United States is not too well concealed behind these moves. As the Seoul *Continental Press* points out:

If we are so tender about American feelings why oughtn't we entrust our side of the ROK-Japan negotiations to them altogether?

Should property and capital be imported to this country through the medium of Korean residents in Japan it would still constitute Japanese capital and techniques. It is only too clear that Japanese industry, crippled by limited markets, welcomes the chance to redominate the Korean market. Moreover, can anyone doubt that the United States, which supports current levels in Japanese industry, would favor Japanese goods in Korea?

And the Seoul *Minguk Ilbo* (Asian Daily News) says:

Reports have it that diplomatic relations between Japan and Korea *Nodong Shinmun* (Labor News) "condemns as intolerable with an informal agreement reached between high-ranking officials of both governments through the mediation of American Ambassador to Korea McConaughy in Tokyo last year on his way back to Korea from the United States. It has long been the policy

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of America to have Japan play a greater role in the defense of the Far East, and it would not be difficult to understand that any mediation by the United States would involve economic problems between Japan and Korea. In fact, it has been reported that the informal agreement envisages settlement of claims mainly by Japanese loans and aid. This will shift the Korean position from demanding claims to begging for aid. Moreover, it has been pointed out that the economic aid Japan is to provide Korea is, in fact, part of Japan's obligation to the United States. This means Japan is to assume the role of provider of American funds.

Or, in more forceful language, the Pyongyang (North Korea) *Nodong Shinmun* (Labor News) "condemns as intolerably reactionary the attempt of the South Korean puppets to import monopoly capital from Japan, at the instruction of the American imperialists. . . . this machination was engineered by the American imperialists, who are desperately trying to prop up their tottering colonial rule, taken aback by the growing demand in South Korea for negotiations between North and South for the unification of the country."

Perhaps, however, some of the anti-Japanese Korean conservatives understand the significance of Japan more clearly than either the Americans, who see it as narrowly economic, or the North Koreans. For more than Japanese capital will be imported. Already, many Korean leftists and socialists owe their political views to Japanese education, magazines, books, and translations. Magazines like *Sekai* and *Chuan Koron* sell for \$2 (compared to the Japanese price of 30c) on the open market in Seoul; students and professors are eager for a chance to visit or study in Japan, and several groups have already been exchanged. In a sense, Japan is Korea's window on the world; and 15 years after Rhee slammed it shut, those Korean intellectuals who are still alive after his bloody persecutions and not in the North feel that it is through Japan that they must break out of their dark isolation. The political parties that bear the socialist label today are desperately in need of contact with socialists around the world, and especially in Japan. Although I have seen several MR Press books with ICA emblems on their covers sold in Seoul bookshops (at prohibitive prices even for college professors) most Korean progressives get their world news through the only source avail-

able—*Time* magazine, sold everywhere at a subsidized price and flown in by the American Army. In short, one of the reasons why some Korean politicians oppose closer relations with Japan, and were recently successful in cancelling a scheduled visit of top-rank Japanese capitalists, is a not unfounded fear of political subversion.

Since April, 1960, Korean progressives, supported by a strong minority of the students, have campaigned for neutral unification and a vague socialism as the only answer to Korea's enormous problems. In the years immediately following the liberation, a radical generation was growing up, educated in the Communist-led resistance to Japanese imperialism. But Rhee's suppressions and the Korean War effectively destroyed it, while preventing the education of new youth by the same methods. Even today, no Korean political history is taught in the universities, though many courses deal with bourgeois interpretations of Western politics. "Colonial education," many Korean professors call it. So Korea's progressives operate under the handicap not only of governmental persecution, but also of a lack of education, training, and experience that can only partly be compensated for by their enthusiasm.

They recognize that neutralism would force United States troops from Korea and that only under a socialist economic system could the country be unified into a viable economic and cultural unit. But to avoid the smear of a brutal McCarthyist brush (although the only active Communists in South Korea are a network of North Koreans who enable Pyongyang radio to scoop South Korean stations on much local news), they have refrained from laying the blame for the country's continued division on the United States, saying the time is not yet ripe for such radical campaigns. Perhaps the socialists are correct, for anti-American sentiment remains an explosive force in a nation accustomed to daily insults from 50,000 wealthy Yankees. (Among American officers, a constant irritant is that they are forbidden to shoot at sight thieves on army compounds.) Perhaps to attack evil at its source would bring only greater repression—a fear justified by Chang's recent clampdown on "Communist," i.e., anti-American, students.

Yet neutralism is also a doubtful goal, for Kim Il Sung's

North Korea, recently called the "showplace of Asian Communism" by *Time* in an article that had an unintended effect upon Korea's intellectuals, is rapidly widening the immense gap separating it from the South and growing ever more confident that, faced with a choice between starvation and Communism, the South Korean peasant would not hesitate to choose the latter. North Korea has stepped up proposals for postal, cultural, and economic exchange which the Chang government, despite some opposition, has immediately turned down. The North's offers of economic aid have been denounced as "propaganda." Again with good reason, for there has been a complete blackout on news from North Korea since the war, and the people are fed only the usual distortions. Chang's government admits quite openly that until the economic and political situation in the South is stabilized, negotiations with the North could only benefit the Communists. A member of his policy committee said: "The fact is that South Korea is not strong enough to cope with North Korea. . . . It is dangerous to talk with North Korea until we have solved our own problems—the problems of so many people without food or clothing." On that, both North and South Korean governments agree. An American professor, after a day lauding the benefits of academic freedom, says privately that the contrasts between North and South are so startling that they must not be allowed to enter into the minds of South Korean students.

North Korea, with a planned economy and massive Russian and Chinese economic aid, is surpassing Japanese per capita production in basic industry, as a result of the victory of Kim's "hard line" over the consumer-oriented "soft line" of his opponents in the North Korea Workers Party. Wartime destruction of Korean industry has been repaired, and Pyongyang has been rebuilt along Moscow lines, with huge workers' apartments lining broad avenues. Kim himself, however, is unpopular in the South, where he is held responsible for the military invasion of 1950; should unification come, it could hardly be, as he now insists, on his own terms.

From the viewpoint of America's Asian policy, Korea is destined to come increasingly under Japanese influence as dollar aid is cut. In an *aide memoire* of October 4, the Chang government stressed its desire to cooperate with Japan as an indication

of its willingness to accept American "suggestions" and prevent an immediate aid decrease. Representative Yun Che Shuk of the Democratic Party says, "We understand the American policy of consolidating the positions of free nations under the developed industries of Germany in the West and Japan in the East." The United States has intervened to prevent harsh punishment of its former friends—Rhee's henchmen and thugs—but Rhee's successors will do their best, despite opposition from some of the many factions emerging from the dream-world of Korean politics, to bring their country into American capitalism's Japanese sphere.

In Japan, the only opposition to the Ikeda government's "expansion in Korea" policy is from those groups that oppose American domination in Japan and elsewhere in Asia—the Socialists and Communists. They oppose recognition of the South Korean government as the sole government in Korea, pointing out that settlement of Korean claims with only half the country cannot be binding on the other half. They are supported by the great majority of Korean residents in Japan, who look upon the North as the legitimate government in Korea and who have lived as second-class citizens, at best, since they were brought over as forced laborers during the occupation.

In a country half of whose budget is American aid—going largely to the upkeep of a "bargain basement" army—the basic dilemma is how to break out of the present human and economic stagnation that American domination has brought, without violently opposing the "benefactors." The American subsidy is barely sufficient to keep the nation's head above the waters of total collapse, but not enough to permit any progress—as is true of United States aid elsewhere in the underdeveloped world. There are persistent reports today that Chang's inefficiency and unpopularity is already causing American dissatisfaction, and that a military dictatorship—under the former leader of Rhee's "greenshirts," General Lee Bum Suk—is in the making. This dilemma is the reason for the disillusioned atmosphere in Seoul today. No one, least of all the Americans there, would be sorry to see United States troops withdrawn; but only unification or Japanese domination can replace American economic aid. And the United States will not let Korea go.

KOREA AND U.S. POLICY IN ASIA

"In Seoul, we have the freedom to drink, make love, and starve," says a young Korean intellectual. "In the North, there is little time for any of these things, and everyone works hard. For myself, I wonder if I am not too corrupted to work and most probably I'll continue to live as a parasite or starve." When you have seen a student friend faint in the street beside you from hunger, you know that he was not joking. When you have seen unemployed college graduates and laborers spend their last 500 *hwan* on enough *yakju* for momentary escape from what looms as a hopeless life, you know what the freedom to drink means. And when you have visited the dark and smoky dance halls where men throw themselves on bored dancing girls, you see the image of a country where even sex is confused by the conflict between forced Western influence and a still-dominant feudal, oriental tradition.

Neither American, Japanese, Communist nor any other kind of domination is really desired by Koreans today, who saw their long-awaited independence destroyed by the cold war. But, as the Korean Communists say, the choice might well be between them and starvation—and not in the distant future.

Hankuk Ilbo sums it up accurately:

Our country is flooded with unemployment. The people's living conditions are growing worse and worse. Rhee's chief henchman has fled to Japan with the aid of the government. Communists penetrate Seoul and unrest grows. The police are using candlesticks for night work, and crime increases while the public morals decline. The government is confused and hasn't done a thing. Its employees are lost and dispirited. Public disappointment is nearing the critical point where the nation cannot be saved from the ensuing situation. It is regrettable to say, but the judgment of the people is now in its last stage of tolerance.

We must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.

—President Eisenhower, Farewell Address, January 17, 1961

THE PHILADELPHIA SEVEN

BY ALEXANDER L. CROSBY

The recent jailing of seven executives of General Electric, Westinghouse, Allis-Chalmers and other corporations was upsetting not only to corporate statesmen but also to the lads who are being trained to replace them. "Ethics Issue Stirs Business Colleges" was the heading of a *New York Times* story that ran more than a full column. The *Times* said students at the Harvard School of Business Administration suffered from "shock and surprise" and at Dartmouth many were "quite disturbed."

The *Times* did not say whether the students were rocked because seven business leaders had to mingle with workingmen for almost 30 days, or because the sentences were lighter than many southern students have got for sitting at lunch counters in defense of the constitution. Whatever the cause, business school faculties think something must be done about morals. Dr. Karl Hill, dean of the Dartmouth School of Business Administration, says the Philadelphia affair has "sparked a great deal of discussion about the whole question of the business executive's social responsibilities."

The professors should think twice before launching a program that would reduce the capitalist system to a shambles. Suppose, for a moment, that a few of today's business leaders had been indoctrinated with social responsibilities during their college years. Let us picture a first working day of one of them: Harold Trueblood, newly elected president of United States Motors. This is the firm that builds the snappy 8-cylinder Uscar, a must car for every status seeker.

Mr. Trueblood's office, which was the exercise room of his predecessor, is unpretentious. A faded Oriental rug covers part of the polished wood floor. The executive desk is a flush door resting on two steel filing cabinets.

Sounds of hammering and sawing are heard from the

A former newspaperman and now a free-lance writer of pamphlets and children's books, Mr. Crosby is a frequent contributor to MONTHLY REVIEW.

former president's vast office. This room is being converted into a library and lounge for employees.

Seated on a plain wooden chair, facing President Trueblood, is the sales manager. He looks uncomfortable.

"Mr. Dynamo, your expense voucher for the New York sales conference shows restaurant expenses averaging \$22 a day per capita. I must point out to you that this kind of extravagance cheats the stockholders of profits they are entitled to. It deprives the government of taxes needed for the public welfare. It sets a bad example for your subordinates. I trust it will not happen again."

"But Mr. Trueblood! I can't take our biggest dealers to hasheries for the \$1 blue plate!"

"You might just try it. I want U.S. Motors to be known as the corporation with a social conscience. And on your way out, would you ask the vice president for production to step in?"

[Enter the vice president for production.]

"Mr. Flywheel, you will recall that in 1926 this company produced an excellent 4-cylinder car, without fins and without multiple head lights and tail lights. We could make a better one now, also without excrescences. Please go to work on it. When it is ready for production, we will discontinue the eight."

"My God, chief, we can't give up the eight! We could never sell that kind of four to the snob market!"

"I am afraid your sense of social responsibility isn't showing. It is more important to provide good transportation at reasonable cost than to increase our profits by marketing an unnecessarily large and expensive automobile. The eight burns too much gasoline, thereby hastening the depletion of our oil resources. It has too much horsepower, thereby contributing to highway deaths. And it costs too much, thereby absorbing family funds that might better be used for education, health, recreation, and other items. Is something the matter, Mr. Flywheel?"

"Er, uh, I just feel a little dizzy, I guess. You don't happen to have some Scotch, do you?"

"Yes, there were some bottles here yesterday, and I don't think Miss Drydame has sent them to the hospital yet. Please take what you need, and on your way out would you ask the advertising manager to drop in?"

[Enter the advertising manager.]

"Mr. Chiselwit, I have studied your plans for the \$50,000,000 campaign in newspapers, magazines, and television. If we sell 1,500,000 cars, each consumer will have to pay \$33 for advertising that does not benefit him in any way. I think a reasonable figure would be \$3 per car. Let's use the classified ads, and omit television. Furthermore, I think we should drop that slogan, 'None Compares With Uscar.' The last issue of *Consumer Reports* rates Uscar as second in overall quality to Continental's Superchariot, and credits Metropolitan's Asphalt Buggy and United's Highway Schooner with certain minor advantages over Uscar."

"But Mr. Trueblood! We have spent millions to promote our slogan over the past 15 years! We can't sell cars without a good slogan!"

"The best slogan, Mr. Chiselwit, is an honest one. You would get a better response if you made a slight change in the slogan to conform to the truth. Let me suggest, 'None Compares With Uscar in Some Respects.' Oh—Miss Drydame! Miss Drydame! Will you bring Mr. Chiselwit some whisky, please? And ask the personnel manager to see me."

[Enter the personnel manager.]

"Mr. Clobberum, I am informed that our production workers earned an average of \$4,086 last year."

"Yeh, and that wasn't so good. They had us over the barrel in negotiations, boss, because the inventory was down. But this year they're hungry. We're going to do a lot better."

"We most certainly will, but I see no reason to wait for the contract negotiations. Call the union representatives and ask if it would be agreeable to reopen the contract for a guaranteed annual wage of \$7,280, including four weeks of vacation. I would like to put this into effect next week."

"You can't do that! It would ruin us, and play hell with the scales in the industry!"

"Mr. Clobberum, I suspect that a good mechanic is worth as much to this firm as you are—perhaps more—and your pay is \$20 an hour. But I am willing to settle for a scale of \$3.50. It seems elementary to me that an intelligently directed industry should be able to provide steady work for its experienced em-

ployees, and that the production workers need just as much vacation as we enjoy. It occurs to me also that you might be happier with another employer. Goodbye Mr. Clobberum."

[Enter Miss Drydame.]

"Mr. Trueblood, the purple light just flashed."

"The purple light? What do you mean, Miss Drydame?"

"Oh—I thought that had been explained to you. It means there is a call from Mr. Conniver of Continental Cars on the private phone in the false wastebasket under your desk."

"And must I lie on my stomach to take the call?"

"Oh, no—just lift out the purple phone. Leave the yellow one and the green one there."

[Voice on telephone.]

"Hell—that you, Hal? Pardon the informality, but I'm looking forward to getting acquainted with you. Just call me Sam. What I'm calling about is this: We are planning a little conference tonight, just after moonrise, in that clump of pine trees near the seventh green at the country club. As you probably know, the Army wants bids on 1,000 station wagons, the Navy is buying 800 wagons, the Air Force needs 1,200 sedans, and the Marines are advertising for 500 pickup trucks. Metropolitan would like to handle the trucks and United is hot for the Navy job. I think you and I can take care of the Army and the Air Force, but we'll have to work out the details. Will 9 p.m. be OK with you?"

"Yes, that will be fine, Mr. Conniver. I hope you won't mind if I bring an old friend of mine from the Harvard School of Business Administration?"

"Well, uh, we generally limit these meetings to the top boys. You sure this fellow is reliable?"

"There is no question of his integrity. He is head of the Anti-Trust Division in the Department of Justice."

"Man, you slay me! Tell you what—I'll bring Bobby Kennedy."

"Mr. Conniver, I am not joking."

"Not joking? Why, you phony s.o.b.!"

[Sound of telephone being hung up.]

"Miss Drydame, will you ask the janitor to empty this wastebasket? I don't think I'll need these extra telephones."

But things could be even worse if the professors get out of control. Because of the blood ties between business and government, the potential havoc from the spread of ethical practices is awesome. Let us move from Harold Trueblood's office to an imaginary White House press conference. A reporter is speaking:

"Mr. President, would you care to sum up our policy in relation to Cuba, Laos, and other countries being taken over by international Communism?"

"Certainly. But let us first understand that international Communism is a fuzzy term employed to cover a multitude of interventions. Our policy is clear. We shall see to it that these countries have the kind of government desired by the ruling class of the United States, in consultation with the ruling classes of the countries involved. Next question?"

LABELING REGIMES

BY CORLISS LAMONT

It isn't often that we see in the Letters to the Editors of the *New York Times* one that we feel says something important and says it well. The letter below is one which, in our judgment, passes both tests. It appeared on March 8.—The Editors

A most significant development in contemporary affairs is that throughout the world, from Indonesia in the Far East to Ghana and Guinea in Africa to Cuba in the Caribbean, former colonial or semi-colonial peoples have been winning national independence and at the same time setting up dynamically led republics that institute socialist programs in order to bring about rapid economic, social, and cultural progress.

It is important for the American people to understand that when such regimes put into effect radical measures, as well as establishing close diplomatic and economic relations with the Communist bloc, this does not mean that they are Communist-controlled or are becoming Communist. Yet most organs of public opinion in our country, many government officials, and large segments of the population in general tend to cry "Com-

THE PHILADELPHIA SEVEN

munist" when indigenous and militant nationalist movements abroad go to the Left.

A prime example of this unfortunate tendency in the United States is seen in the constant use of the term Communist in reference to the Cuban government headed by Fidel Castro.

When the Eisenhower administration treated this regime as a pariah, and finally ruled out all American-Cuban trade except in food and drugs, Premier Castro and his associates decided—with the very survival of their country at stake—that the most effective countervailing policy was to fill in the void by large-scale commercial agreements with Soviet Russia and Communist China.

Also the Cuban Republic, stimulated to a considerable degree by the hostile actions of the American government and American business interests, enacted drastic reforms in agriculture and industry.

But none of this implies that the Castro regime is controlled or run by Communists, either native or foreign. The revolutionary government of Cuba came into power as the result of an indigenous, non-Communist movement. That government remains thoroughly independent and continues to experiment with a socialist economy especially adapted to Cuban conditions and the Cuban people.

Of course, however, both the Cuban and American opponents of the Castro regime will keep on calling it Communist as a matter of propaganda and political strategy.

If the American people, and especially our State Department, now making a fresh start under President Kennedy, misunderstand the situation in Cuba and other nations that have recently emerged into freedom, there could be disastrous effects on United States foreign policy and international peace. For to ascribe home-grown movements toward national independence and socialism to some sort of Communist conspiracy directed from Moscow or Peiping not only greatly exaggerates the power of the Communist bloc, but also leads to provocative claims of Communist intervention or aggression when it does not exist.

WORLD EVENTS

By Scott Nearing

We were able to spend the time between late December, 1960 and early March, 1961 in Cuba, Haiti, Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico, Trinidad, British Guiana, Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, Nicaragua, and Guatemala. We will devote a part of this and the next issue of *World Events* to some comments and conclusions based on our observations.

Unrest in Latin America

Four major social forces are upsetting the Latin American applecart and causing no end of trouble to the State Department's stand-patters and other reactionaries who have been enjoying the apples and do not want them scattered, dirtied, or bruised. The *first* of these forces is the feudal survivals that clog and obstruct the Latin American culture stream. The *second* is the bourgeois revolution, which is the outstanding force in present-day Latin America. The *third* is the aggressive intrusion of Yankee imperialism into Latin American economics and politics. The *fourth* is an assortment of projects for throwing feudal survivals and imperialist aggressions out of the Latin American window, by-passing capitalism, and setting up a collectivist, socialist or communist society south of the Rio Grande.

All four of these forces are playing varying roles in different Latin American countries. All are responsible for the omnipresent change and turmoil, the sense of insecurity and uncertainty, and the widely-held hopes and aspirations which a visitor encounters in every Latin American country.

Feudal Survivals

Latin America is predominantly agricultural. It was in a predominantly agricultural Europe that feudalism developed its characteristic features—rule by landlords, warlords, and churchmen. Rural Latin America today is in the hands of the same feudal triumvirate: estate owners, generals, and priests.

At the bottom of the Latin American power pyramid are

the field hands—men and women who cultivate the soil and harvest the sugar, coffee, cocoa, tobacco, fruit, and cotton. Usually they are barefoot, even where the going is rough and dangerous. Usually they lift, tug, and carry by hand or on human backs. At the going rate of wages, they are cheaper than machines. Despite the cheapness of their labor, they are beginning to be by-passed by modern techniques. We saw an important road development through high mountains in Guatemala. In its earlier stages the work had been done by brigades of peons with picks, shovels, hammers, wedges, bars, wheelbarrows. Now excavators, bulldozers, trucks, air compressors, and dynamite have dispensed with much of the hand labor.

This intervention of machinery is still the exception rather than the rule in Latin America. Again and again on construction projects we saw idle machines and busy humans. In the capital city of a more backward Latin American republic we saw the earlier stages of a new government office building. Foundations were being dug with picks and battered shovels. Forms were being put in place and concrete was being mixed. The mixing floor was the pavement of a street that ran beside the construction site. Gravel, sand, and cement had been brought in by truck and dumped around the mixing floor. With shovels and iron-tired wheelbarrows gravel was brought to the mixing floor and spread five or six inches deep over an area of about 25 by 40 feet. Three inches of sand was spread over the gravel and covered with a layer of cement. A dozen barefoot peons equipped with shovels turned the material three times. Water carried in pails from a near-by barrel was poured over the mixture; then the whole mass was turned into sticky concrete by barefoot shovelers, standing and working in the concrete. Workers then shoveled the concrete into pails and five-gallon oilcans, put the containers on their heads, carried them over rough ground anywhere from 40 to 150 feet, and dumped them into the forms.

After watching the operation for a time we inquired whether there were no cement mixers. "Certainly we have mixers," was the reply, "but they must be imported and are expensive. This labor is cheap. Besides, we have a serious unemployment problem here and there is much unrest. If these men were not shoveling concrete, they would be demanding relief or

organizing a demonstration against the government. It is much better to have them working here where we can keep an eye on them."

Unskilled workers (peons) are paid meager subsistence wages, from thirty to seventy cents for an eight hour day. Their clothing is inadequate. Many of the hovels and shacks in which they live are without furniture and windows, barely provide shelter against the elements, lack running water, light, and toilet facilities. Their diet is unbalanced and insufficient. They suffer from intestinal diseases, hookworm, malaria. The majority of them are illiterate. After being subjected for four centuries to the dominant forces of Christian civilization, millions of Latin American land workers are still victims of exploitation, seasonal employment, illiteracy, poverty, disease, neglect, degradation.

Bitter experiences with the civilizers and with the more revolting features of western civilization have aroused Latin American land workers to protest and frequently to revolt. Field hands are organized. Wage demands, strikes, demonstrations, and picketing are commonly reported in the press. Seasonal employment, with its resulting hardship and poverty, is in glaring contrast with the comfort-filled lives of the well-to-do and the rich. In Mexico, Nicaragua, and Cuba, land workers made up the rank and file followers of Villa, Zapata, Carillo, Sandino, and Castro. Because of their large numbers and the fierce pressures under which they and their families live, they provide the logical mass support for Latin American revolutionary movements.

Ever since white Europeans settled in Latin America, slaves, serfs, and peons have lived under revolting conditions. Their forced underpaid labor has supported the relatively high living standards of the landed gentry, the military leaders, and the churchmen. Today estate owners, living in comparative ease and luxury, are unpopular with the underpaid land workers. The army and the church have sided with the land owners and played their respective roles in keeping the workers in subjection. In consequence they are suspected and distrusted by large sections of the rural population.

Feudal institutions are not only unpopular; they have had their day in Latin America, as they did in Europe. In both cases landlordism, militarism, and clericalism proved too rigid and

custom-bound to adapt themselves to the changing times and to take advantage of the new technology. Like chattel slavery, feudalism is being pushed into the shadow by the spectacular advances in science, production, transportation, communication, and specialization. Latin American feudalism has pinched and starved and warped its labor force and has failed to adapt itself to the expansive demands of a changing world. Like chattel slavery, it is being superseded by new culture forms which offer more advantages to larger and larger segments of the Latin American population.

Latin America's Bourgeois Revolution

All Latin America is divided into two parts: the countryside and the city. Feudal survivals still dominate the countryside. In the cities the bourgeois revolution is in full swing.

Historically, this is not a new opposition. Latin American agriculture has been based on a superabundance of cheap hand labor since the Iberian conquerors began plundering and enslaving the natives nearly five centuries ago. Urban centers of trade, commerce, and industry existed long before Europeans captured and occupied Latin America's corner lots. But the present extreme contrast between countryside and city has sharpened with the advent of the machine age and has continued to grow as South America followed the lead of North America along the path toward industrialization.

City building moved at a slower pace in South America than in North America until the early years of the present century. Then it began to pick up speed. Today an explosive expansion of city life, based on auto traffic along well paved broad streets has trebled the population of cities like Bogotá, Colombia, and Caracas, Venezuela, during the past fifteen years.

Latin American cities have spread out rapidly. At the same time they have shot up into the air. Banks, insurance companies, oil companies, and real estate promoters have built skyscrapers. Luxury hotels rival the business structures. Government office buildings have followed suit. Motor traffic streams through the narrow streets of the old cities and rushes along the broad avenues and thoroughways of the newly built-up areas.

Who is providing the capital for such expansion? Part

comes from the government, part from foreign sources, and part from Latin American investors. The expansion impetus came with the brisk demand and high prices created by the wars of 1914-18 and 1939-45. All of the food and raw materials that Latin America could produce was swallowed up by war demand. At the same time the shortage of manufactures led to the establishment and enlargement of Latin America's infant manufacturing industries. While suffering no war damage, Latin America was enriched by urgent war needs and by the high prices paid for war supplies. Most of the new wealth went not into the countryside, but into the building of commercial and industrial cities.

Modern city building requires materials, skills, manpower. Modern commerce and industry have parallel needs. Industrialization and modernization in Latin America have called into being a technological intelligentsia plus a wide variety of real estate operators, financiers, and enterprisers. Latin American cities have their new-rich speculators, and get-rich-quick profiteers together with the armies of white collar workers who make up the rank and file of the rapidly expanding middle class.

While Latin American peasants and villagers work for a few cents a day, live in squalor, and walk barefoot through the streets of the expanding cities, bankers, manufacturers, engineers, and government officials work in well-appointed, air-conditioned buildings, ride in plush cars, live in luxurious dwellings, and have the added satisfaction of being able to hire as many men and women servants as they care to crowd into their roomy houses.

Only a few years ago it was the landlords, the generals, the politicians, and the churchmen who occupied the apex of the Latin American wealth-power pyramid. Today business men and their professional and technically trained associates and assistants are sharing leadership with generals and politicians. Landlords and clerics play minor roles in the unfolding wealth-power drama.

Perhaps we can symbolize the situation in one comment. In the Latin American countryside, churches and the homes of land-owners are the big buildings. Churches, in particular, dominate the landscape. In the new cities, commercial and industrial structures overtop churches as churches overtop village hovels. During

WORLD EVENTS

more than two months of traveling in Latin America we did not see a single church in process of construction, although some were being remodeled and redecorated. We did see scores and hundreds of impressive, commercial, industrial, and government buildings newly built or on the way toward completion.

The bourgeois revolution is far advanced in many Latin American countries. The mushrooming bourgeois world dwarfs the feudal survivals of the countryside into insignificance and forces the former masters of Latin American life to accept roles of secondary importance.

Latin American feudalism imposed hardship on its labor force that led to unrest and periodic revolt. The rush of the bourgeois revolution called into existence a low paid, restless city working class, developed an insecure middle class, and opened the way for the new advances in social organization that presently dominate the Latin American scene.

If Laos Falls

Laos under a Communist government would endanger the security and peace of all of southeast Asia, said President Kennedy to his press conference on March 23, 1961. He added: "All we want in Laos is peace; not war." This statement is not quite accurate. What Washington wants in Laos is an anti-Communist government like those of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization nations. (SEATO is composed of the United States, Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, and three "other" nations of southeast Asia: Pakistan, the Philippines, and Thailand.) Under the Truman-Eisenhower-Kennedy doctrine the United States is committed to use military force if necessary to prevent Laos or any other nation of southeast Asia from going Communist.

Monthly Review Associates invites you to hear an

EYEWITNESS REPORT ON THE CUBAN INVASION

by LEO HUBERMAN

who will return from Cuba and Jamaica early in May

Date: Monday, May 22, 8:30 P.M.

Place: Fraternal Clubhouse, 110 W. 48 St., N.Y.C.

Admission: \$1 in advance . . \$1.50 at door . . Associates free

Send for tickets to MR Associates, 66 Barrow St., N.Y. 14, N.Y.

WHERE WE STAND

BY THE EDITORS

During the early years of the 20th century the subject of socialism was widely and eagerly discussed in the United States. Eugene V. Debs, socialist candidate for president, polled close to 1,000,000 votes in 1912—the equivalent of approximately 3,000,000 votes in the 1948 election. The popular interest in socialism was reflected in an enormous sale of socialist literature. *The Appeal to Reason*, a weekly, had a circulation of more than 300,000 for several years; pamphlets by Oscar Ameringer were printed in editions of hundreds of thousands; books by Bellamy, Upton Sinclair, and Jack London ranked with the best-sellers of the day.

This widespread interest in socialism has declined to such an extent that today it would probably not be an exaggeration to say that for the great majority of Americans "socialism" is little more than a dirty word. This is an extraordinary situation because it occurs at the very moment that a large proportion of the rest of the world is moving toward socialism at an unprecedentedly rapid rate. It is a deeply disturbing situation because there are still many Americans who believe with us that, in the long run, socialism will prove to be the only solution to the increasingly serious economic and social problems that face the United States.

It is because we hold firmly to this belief that we are founding MONTHLY REVIEW, an independent magazine devoted to analyzing, from a socialist point of view, the most significant trends in domestic and foreign affairs.

By "socialism" we mean a system of society with two fundamental characteristics: first, public ownership of the decisive sectors of the economy, and second, comprehensive planning of production for the benefit of the producers themselves.

The possibility and workability of such a system of society are no longer open to doubt. Socialism became a reality with the introduction of the First Five Year Plan in Soviet Russia in 1928; its

Reprinted from Vol. I, (May, 1949) and the first issue of every subsequent year.

WHERE WE STAND

power to survive was demonstrated by the subsequent economic achievements of the USSR during the '30s, and finally, once and for all, in the war against Nazi Germany. These facts—and they are facts which no amount of wishful thinking can conjure away—give to the USSR a unique importance in the development of socialism and in the history of our time.

We find completely unrealistic the view of those who call themselves socialists, yet imagine that socialism can be built on an international scale by fighting it where it already exists. This is the road to war, not to socialism. On the other hand, we do not accept the view that the USSR is above criticism simply because it is socialist. We believe in, and shall be guided by, the principle that the cause of socialism has everything to gain and nothing to lose from a full and frank discussion of shortcomings, as well as accomplishments, of socialist countries and socialist parties everywhere.


We shall follow the development of socialism all over the world, but we want to emphasize that our major concern is less with socialism abroad than with socialism at home. We are convinced that the sooner the United States is transformed from a capitalist to a socialist society, the better it will be, not only for Americans, but for all mankind.

We believe that there are already many Americans who share this attitude with us and that their number will steadily increase. We ask for their financial support, their assistance in extending our circulation, and their advice as to how MONTHLY REVIEW can best serve the cause of socialism in the United States.

Clarity about the aims and problems of socialism is of greatest significance in our age of transition. Since, under present circumstances, free and unhindered discussion of these problems has come under a powerful taboo, I consider the founding of this magazine to be an important public service.

PROFESSOR ALBERT EINSTEIN

in his article "Why Socialism?" in Vol. I, No. 1



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(Continued from Inside Back Cover)

important attack on civil liberties in the benighted state of New Hampshire.

Because of recent Supreme Court decisions, the fight for civil liberties looks bleak indeed. But we cannot let Hugo De Gregory go to jail without putting up the best fight we can. De Gregory is a poor man, as are most of the victims of McCarthyism. All the more reason to give, and give freely, to help in the defense of this stalwart champion of civil liberty.

Please send your contribution to De Gregory Defense Committee, Box 66, Harvard Station, Cambridge 38, Mass.

* * *

AS WE GO TO PRESS, THE CRIMINAL INVASION OF CUBA HAS BEGUN. Leo Huberman is in Havana now. When he left here on April 14, he expected to go from Cuba to Jamaica where he has been invited to speak about the Cuban Revolution. His first-hand report will be the feature of the MR Associates 12th Birthday Meeting on May 22 at Fraternal Clubhouse (see p. 45 for details).

(continued from inside front cover)

Unconfirmed reports said that the object of the twin uprisings was to steal fast patrol-torpedo (PT) boats, many of them purchased in East Germany, from Dr. Castro. The regime uses them to patrol the coast against an attack or the landing of saboteurs.

Several of the PT boats succeeded in escaping, but quick action by Castro forces foiled the larger conspiracy.

Observers found a coincidence in the presence of the cable ship Western Union, said to be carrying 180,000 gallons of fuel that could be used in the PT boats near Baracoa the day of the uprising. [Emphasis ours.]

We tell you this story in these Notes rather than in our Review Of The Month where it properly belongs because we want to bring home to you the urgent necessity for prompt action on your part in arousing the American people to the danger of our country's war policy. Talk to everyone you know. Telephone your protest to the State Department or the White House. Think of ways of organizing your community. This is the supreme patriotism of our day. This is your commitment now.

* * *

The two new MR Press books, advertised on the back cover, have been sent to the printer. *Guerrilla Warfare*, by Che Guevara, is a much shorter book and should be ready by May 15. *From Yalta to Disarmament* is being rushed but because it is a big book, it won't be off the press until the end of July. We underpriced it at \$3.50 prepublication, but never mind, we will be happy to have you take advantage of our mistake and order it right away—both books for the bargain price of \$5. Meanwhile, our thanks to the many readers who have already ordered.

Speaking of bargains, publication date for *North From Mexico* by Carey McWilliams is June 1, when the price will be \$5.00. Until that date, and only until then, you can buy it at the prepublication price of \$3.00.

Good news: we have just put in a reorder for 2000 more paperback *Cuba: Anatomy of a Revolution*. Sales to bookstores have been going fine and, in addition, we have had the cooperation of many of our readers. Here, for example, is a letter, just received, from our good friend Fred Blossom:

Here's \$15 for 15 more Cuba paperbacks. We are sending them broadcast to friends with an invitation to keep the book and send us a dollar. We hope to be able to order 25 more. This, we feel, is the least we can do at this critical juncture to help establish socialism on this side of the Atlantic Ocean.

Go thou and do likewise.

Each year, in May, we publish our statement of "Where We Stand" which appeared in Vol. 1, No. 1 twelve years ago. Please show it to friends whom you are trying to interest in an MR sub.

Readers in the Philadelphia area are planning to meet for study and discussion, and perhaps to invite occasional speakers. Those interested in attending are asked to get in touch by mail or telephone with Gaylord LeRoy, 1552 Edge Hill Road, Abington, Pa. Phone: OLdfield 9-6372.

From Harvey O'Connor, himself in the shadow of a jail sentence for defying the House Un-American Activities Committee, comes this appeal:

While the spotlight of national publicity plays on the cases of Carl Braden and Frank Wilkinson, we are likely to overlook the equally

(Continued on Page 48)

2 New



Press Books

**FROM YALTA TO DISARMAMENT:
Cold War Debate**

by

J. P. MORRAY

Price on publication: probably \$7.50, perhaps more
Prepublication price: \$3.50 (you save at least \$4)

GUERRILLA WARFARE

by

CHE GUEVARA

Price on publication: probably \$3, perhaps \$3.50
Prepublication price: \$2.00 (you save at least \$1)

BOTH BOOKS — \$5

The books are not yet ready but they will be sent as soon as they are off the press. Please send your order for either book, or both, right away.

Send your order, with payment enclosed, to

MR Press

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New York 14, N. Y.

